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Abstract
In the field of access control, delegation is an impor-
tant aspect that is considered as a part of the administra-
tion mechanism. Thus, a complete access control must pro-
vide a flexible administration model to manage delegation.
Unfortunately, to our best knowledge, there is no complete
model for describing all delegation requirements for role-
based access control. Therefore, proposed models are often
extended to consider new delegation characteristics, which
is a complex task to manage and necessitate the redefinition
of these models.
In this paper we describe a new delegation approach for
extended role-based access control models. We show that
our approach is flexible and is sufficient to manage all del-
egation requirements.
1. Introduction
The delegation is the process whereby a user without any
administrative prerogatives obtains the ability to grant some
authorizations. In the field of access control, defining con-
cept of delegation is a difficult issue and only few works are
dedicated to this point [2, 3, 4, 12, 13].
These works showed that delegation is a complex prob-
lem to solve and is generally modeled separately from other
administration requirements. The reason is that proposed
models are generally based on the RBAC model [9] (Role-
Based Access Control), which is not expressive enough to
deal with delegation requirements such as temporary, par-
tial, multi-step or multiple delegation. For instance, in the
RBAC model, the only way to grant permission to a sub-
ject is by granting this permission to a given role and then
assigning this role to the subject. This is a rigid scenario,
which does not adequately answer the need of fine-grained
delegation.
Therefore, it is necessary to extend the RBAC model by
adding new components, such as new types of roles, per-
missions and/or relations. This is a complex task to man-
age, and to our best knowledge, there is no complete model
for describing all delegation requirements. Thus, delegation
models themselves are extended to consider new delegation
characteristics.
In this paper, we aim at proposing a flexible and com-
plete delegation approach for role based access control. Our
work is based on the OrBAC [1] (Organization based Ac-
cess Control) formalism, which provides integrated frame-
work to deal with various security requirements including
delegation requirements.
Namely, the OrBAC model gives means to specify con-
textual authorizations, which facilitate the modeling of del-
egation characteristics such as temporary delegation, cas-
cading revocation, etc. In addition, in AdOrBAC [7] (Ad-
ministration model for OrBAC) a large number of condi-
tions can be expressed thanks to the use of views (in Or-
BAC model a view is an access control entity used to put
together objects to which apply the same authorizations, for
more details see [7]).
This provides means to specify fine-grained delegation
constraints, such as prerequisite conditions for the grantor
(the user who performs the delegation) and the grantee (the
user who receives the delegation). Therefore the adminis-
trator can restrict the delegation by specifying delegation
constraints that grantor and grantee must satisfy.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we start
with basic concepts of the OrBAC and AdOrBAC models.
In section 3 we present our delegation model. We discuss
in section 4 the complexity and the decidability of our ap-
proach. Then related work are given in section 5. Finally,
concluding remarks are made in section 6.
2. Basic concepts for OrBAC
Before presenting our delegation model, we shall briefly
recall the main components of OrBAC.
2.1. OrBAC model
The central entity in OrBAC is the entity organization.
Intuitively, an organization is any entity that is responsible
for managing a security policy.
The objective of OrBAC is to specify the security policy
at the organization level that is independently of the imple-
mentation of this policy.
Thus, instead of modeling the policy by using the con-
crete concepts of subject, action and object, the OrBAC
model suggests reasoning with the roles that subjects, ac-
tions or objects play in the organization.
The role of a subject is simply called a role, whereas the
role of an action is called activity and the role of an object
is called view.
In OrBAC, there are eight basic sets of entities: Org (a
set of organizations), S (a set of subjects), A (a set of ac-
tions), O (a set of objects), R (a set of roles), A (a set of ac-
tivities), V (a set of views) and C (a set of contexts). How-
ever, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the policy
applies to a single organization and thus we omit the Org
entity in the following.
In the following we present the basic OrBAC builtin
predicates:
- empower is a predicate over domains SxR. If s a sub-
ject and r a role, then empower(s, r) means that sub-
ject s is empowered in role r.
- use is a predicate over domains OxV . If o is an object
and v is a view, then use(o, v) means that object o is
used in view v.
- consider is a predicate over domains AxA. If α is an
action and a is an activity, then consider(α, a) means
that action α implements the activity a.
- hold is a predicate over domains SxAxOxC. If s
a subject, α an action, o an object and c a context,
hold(s, α, o, c) means that context c holds between
subject s, action α and object o.
- permission, prohibition and obligation are predicates
over domains RsxAaxVoxC. Where Rs= R ∪ S, Aa
= A ∪ A and Vo= V ∪ O. More precisely, if g is a
role or a subject, t is a view or an object and p is an
activity or an action, then permission(g, p, t, c) (resp.
prohibition(g, p, t, c) or obligation(g, p, t, c)) means
that, grantee g is granted permission (resp. prohibi-
tion or obligation) to perform privilege p on target t in
context c.
Since in the OrBAC model it is possible to spec-
ify both permissions and prohibitions, some conflicts
may occur. In prioritized OrBAC [5] the authorization
rules are associated with priorities in order to evaluate
their significance in conflicting situations. Then, pred-
icates permission(g, p, t, c) and prohibition(g, p, t, c)
are replaced by: permission(g, p, t, c, l) and
prohibition(g, p, t, c, l), where l is the priority level.
The OrBAC model is self administrated, that is the con-
cepts used to define an administration policy are similar to
the ones presented in this section. We give in the following
section the basic concepts of the AdOrBAC model.
2.2. AdOrBAC model
The approach in AdOrBAC is to define administration
functions by considering different administrative views.
Objects belonging to these views have specific seman-
tics; More precisely, we shall consider in the following
two administrative views called role assignment and license
views. They are respectively interpreted as an assignment of
a user to a role in the role assignment view and a permission
to a role or to a user in the license view.
Intuitively, inserting an object in these views will enable
an authorized user to respectively assign a user to a role,
assign a permission to a role or assign a permission to a
user. Conversely, deleting an object from these views will
enable a user to perform a revocation.
Defining the administration functions in AdOrBAC then
corresponds to specifying which role is permitted to have an
access to administrative views. So that only valid licenses
can be created.
The AdOrBAC approach is homogeneous with the re-
mainder of the OrBAC model. The syntax used to define
permission to administer the policy is completely similar to
the remainder of OrBAC.
The two administrative views license and
role assignment are defined as follows:
License view is used to specify and manage the security
policy. Objects belonging to the license view have the fol-
lowing attributes: grantee: subject to which the license is
granted, privilege: action permitted by the license, target:
object to which the license grants an access and context:
specific conditions that must be satisfied to use the license.
The existence of a valid license is interpreted as a per-
mission by the following rule:
permission(Sub,Act, Obj, Context):-
use(L, license), grantee(L, Sub),
privilege(L,Act), target(L,Obj),
context(L,Context).
Role assignment view is associated with the following
attributes: assignee: subject to which the role is assigned
and assignment: role assigned by the role assignment.
There is the following rule to interpret objects of the
role assignment view:
empower(Subject, Role):-
use(RA, role assignment),
assignee(RA,Subject), assignment(RA,Role).
3 Delegation model
We define in this section our delegation model. We show
that the expressiveness of AdOrBAC is sufficient to manage
delegation requirements without adding new components to
the model.
We present in this section the main delegation charac-
teristics [2] like totality, permanence, monotonicity, lev-
els of delegation, multiple delegation, cascading revocation,
grant-dependency and show how to model them using the
OrBAC formalism.
The approach we suggest to manage delegation is the use
of the notion of contexts and administrative views as defined
in AdOrBAC.
We define two administrative views: the li-
cense delegation view and the role delegation view.
These views are used, respectively, to delegate rights
(partial delegation) and roles (total delegation) and they are
defined as follows:
permission(GR,A,O,C) :-
use(L, license delegation), grantee(L,GR),
privilege(L,A), target(L,O), context(L,C).
empower(GR,Role) :-
use(RD, role delegation),
assignee(RD,GR), assignment(RD,Role).
Objects belonging to these views have the same
attributes, respectively, as the license view and the
role assignment view but also have an additional attribute
called grantor : the subject who is creating the license or
the role.
Inserting an object in the license delegation view or in
the role delegation view will enable a grantor to respec-
tively delegate permission and role to a grantee. Therefore
to manage delegation policy we must define which grantor
(role or user) have an access to these views and in which
context. This is defined by facts having the following form:
permission(gr, delegate, license delegation, context).
permission(gr, delegate, role delegation, context).
To illustrate the approach, let us consider a situation
where there are two users, John a professor and Mary his
secretary. The role secretary is not generally permitted to
have an access to the view stud notes. However, John de-
cides to delegate to Mary a permission to update his stu-
dent’s notes. Obviously, John must have a permission to
delegate this right.
For this purpose, the administrator should first create the
following administrative view:
use(L, note delegation):-
use(L, license delegation),
privilege(L, update), target(L, stud notes).
The view note delegation is derived from li-
cense delegation view and only contains licenses to
update student’s notes.
The administrator should then give to the role professor
the permission to delegate licenses in this view:
permission(prof, delegate, note delegation, nominal).
where nominal represents the default context.
Using this permission, John can delegate to Mary a per-
mission to update his student’s notes by creating a new
license L1, in the note delegation view, with the follow-
ing attributes: grantee: Mary, privilege: update, target:
John stud notes (which is a sub-view of stud notes) and
context: nominal. As a result, the following permission is
created:
permission(mary, update, john stud notes, nominal).
Notice here that John can delegate the permission to up-
date the view John stud notes because this is a sub view of
stud notes.
Therefore we assume that if the grantor have the permis-
sion to delegate the license L then he also have the permis-
sion to delegate a license L’, which is a sub license of L.
We shall now formally define different types of dele-
gation parameters, namely permanence, monotonicity, lev-
els of delegation, multiple delegation; cascading revocation
and grant dependent revocation. For this purpose, we need
define the following predicate to verify if the license L is a
sub license of L’:
sub license(L,L′):-
target(L, T ), target(L′, T ′), sub target(T, T ′),
privilege(L, P ), privilege(L′, P ′), sub priv(P, P ′),
context(L,C), context(L′, C′), sub context(C,C′).
We consider O is a sub target of O’ if there are two views
and O is a sub view of O’, or if O is an object used in the
view O’, or if they are equal.
sub target(O,O′):-
sub view(O,O′);use(O,O′);O = O′.
Similarly, we define predicates sub privilege and
sub context.
We also define the following predicate to verify if li-
censes L and L’ are equivalent:
equiv licenses(L,L′): -
sub license(L,L′), sub license(L′, L).
3.1. Permanence
Permanence refers to types of delegation in terms of their
time duration. Indeed, in some circumstances, the delega-
tion only applies temporarily and will be automatically re-
voked after a given deadline. This may be modeled in our
approach by simply using a temporal context. For further
details about the context definition see [6].
In the previous example, there is no temporal specifica-
tion of time duration in the context of delegation, so the
delegation is permanent. Now if we assume that John wants
to delegate to Mary the permission to update his student’s
notes only during his vacation, then he must specify this
condition in the delegation context associated with the new
license L2 he creates for Mary. The license L2 is similar
to L1 except that context = during John vacation. The del-
egated permission is specified as follows:
permission(mary, update, john stud notes,
during john vacation).
3.2. Monotonicity
Monotonic delegation means that upon delegation the
grantor maintains the permission he has delegated, as de-
scribed in the example of previous sections. On the other
hand, with a non-monotonic delegation, the grantor loses
this permission for the duration of the delegation.
To model non-monotonic delegation we define the li-
cense transfer view as follows:
use(L, license delegation):-
use(L, license transfer).
prohibition(Sub,Act, Obj, C,Max):-
use(L, license transfer),
grantor(L, Sub), privilege(L,Act),
target(L,Obj), context(L,C).
The license transfer view is a sub view of the li-
cense delegation view. So, inserting an object in this view
will create a new permission to the grantee. In addition, it
will create an interdiction to the grantor associated with the
highest priority level Max. Therefore, the grantor will lose
the permission he has delegated.
Note that, the context of the prohibition and the dele-
gated permission is the same one. So the grantor will lose
this permission only for the time of the delegation.
3.3 Multiple delegation
Multiple delegation refers to the number of grantees to
whom a grantor can delegate the same right at any given
time. To control the delegation we assume that this num-
ber (Nm) is fixed by the administrator using the context
max multi delegation. In simple delegation case Nm is
equal to 1:
permission(subject, delegate, view, context
&max multi delegation(Nm)).
To define the context max multi delegation we need to
count the delegation number concerning the same grantor
and the same right:
hold(S,A, L,max multi delegation(Nm)):-
use(L, license delegation),
grantor(L, S), count(L′, use(L′, license delegation),
grantor(L′, S), equiv licenses(L,L′), Nm′),
Nm′ <= Nm.
We assume that count(V, p(V),N) is a predicate that count
the set of instances of variable V that satisfies predicate
p(V). N represents the result of the count predicate.
Note that, we consider the licenses L and L’ are the same
right since they are equivalent.
To explain this, let us consider the same roles of the pre-
vious example. Suppose now we are in a simple delegation
case, so that John can delegate the right to update his stu-
dent’s notes only for one time:
permission(john, delegate, note delegation,
max multi delegation(1)).
Thus, if John delegate to Mary the permission to up-
date the view John students notes, then John does not
have the permission to delegate this right to another
user. For instance, he cannot delegate the permission to
update the file master stud notes, which belongs to the
view John stud notes, to his assistant since this right is a
sub license of the first one.
Notice that when the max multi delegation context is not
used, the number of permissions a subject can delegate is
not restricted. So this subject can delegate as many licenses
he wants.
3.4 Level of delegation
This characteristic defines whether or not each delega-
tion can be further delegated and how many times.
For this purpose, we define the grant option licence
view as follows :
permission(U, delegate, Licence, C&valid level):-
use(L, grant option license), grantee(L,U),
target(L,Licence), context(L,C).
The context valid level is defined as follows:
hold(U, delegate, L, valid level):-
use(L′, grant option license), sub licence(L′, L),
grantor(L′, U), level(L, V ), level(L′, V ′), V ′ < V.
Objects belonging to the grant option licence view have
an additional attribute called level: the number of autho-
rized delegation steps.
Inserting a license in this view will create a permission
to the grantee to delegate the right but only in the context
valid level.
This means that, if we consider the same license L1 of
the previous example and suppose that John wants to grant
his secretary the permission to delegate this license with a
delegation level equal to 3.
For this purpose, John creates in the
grant option licence view the licence L3 with the fol-
lowing attributes: grantee: Mary, privilege: delegate,
target: L1, level: 3, context: nominal.
This corresponds to the following rule:
permission(mary, delegate, L1, valid level).
Therefore Mary can delegate the license L1 (or a
sub license of L1) in the context valid level, which means
that she can create a license L4 to grant another user to del-
egate this license and the delegation level of L4 must be
lower than 3, since the delegation level of L3 is equal to 3.
The grantor can also restrict the scope of the delegation
using conjunctive context. For instance, John can specify,
in the delegation context, that Mary can grant another user
to delegate L1 only during her vacation:
permission(mary, delegate, L1, valid level
&during mary vacation).
In this case, Mary can further delegate the license she
receives from John but the delegated license will only apply
in the context during Mary vacation.
Note that we consider here only the monotonic and the
partial delegation. The grant option licence view is also
used in the total delegation case (multi-step role delegation)
and non monotonic delegation case (multi-step transfer). A
more detailed model will be proposed in future work.
3.5 Revocation
Revocation is an important aspect in delegation models.
In this section we present some revocation properties
and we plan to give a more detailed presentation in a
forthcoming paper.
Grant Dependency In the case of Grant Dependent revo-
cation (GD) only the grantor is allowed to revoke the dele-
gated license or role. On the other hand, Grant Independent
revocation (GID) allows any member in the sponsoring role
to revoke the grantee. This is modeled using contexts:
permission(subject, revoke, license delegation, gd).
permission(subject, revoke, license delegation, gid).
The gd and gid contexts are defined as follows:
hold(User, revoke, L, gd):-
use(L, license delegation), grantor(L,User).
hold(User, revoke, L, gid):-
use(L, license delegation), grantor(L,GR),
empower(GR,Role), empower(User,Role).
Contexts gd and gid are relevant for license revocation,
we can similarly define gdr and gidr to revoke a role.
Cascading revocation In multi-step delegation it is neces-
sary to give the possibility to revoke indirectly the delega-
tion chain.
We can model this property thanks to the contextual li-
cense: the delegation of right is valid only if the grantor still
has this right.
For this purpose we define the view cascad-
ing delegation, which is a sub view of license delegation
view, as follows:
permission(Sub,Act, Obj, C&valid deleg(gr)):-
use(L, cascading delegation), grantee(L, Sub),
grantor(L, gr), privilege(L,Act),
target(L,Obj), context(L,C).
Inserting an object in this view will create a permission
with an additional context (valid deleg context) which ver-
ify if the grantor still has his right.
This context is defined as follows:
hold(User,A,O, valid deleg(gr)):-
is permitted(User,A,O).
Therefore, the delegated permission is valid only if the
delegation chain is maintained.
Note that this property only concerns monotonic delega-
tion. Other revocation aspects remain to be investigated in
further work.
4 Decidability and complexity
The OrBAC model is based on first order logic and more
precisely on Datalog [11] which ensures a decidable and
tractable theory.
Datalog programs do not allow the use of functional
terms and must only include both defined and safe rules.
A rule is defined if every variable that appears in the con-
clusion also appears in the premise. A rule is safe if it only
provides means to derive a finite set of new facts. In pure
Datalog program, rules do not contain any negative literal.
Pure Datalog guarantees that any access control policy will
be decidable in polynomial time. However pure Datalog
expressivity is very restricted.
In Datalog¬, the negation restriction is relaxed. Nega-
tive literals are allowed but rules must be stratified [11].
A stratified Datalog¬ program is computable in polynomial
time.
The definition of security policies using the OrBAC
model obeys the Datalog¬ restriction except the definition
of contexts through the hold predicate. More precisely, the
security rules correspond to ground close facts specified us-
ing the permission, prohibition predicates. Specifications
of predicates empower, use and consider correspond also to
facts or rules that respect the Datalog¬ restriction.
By contrast, the definition of contexts does not corre-
spond to Datalog¬ restriction for the following reasons:
these rules contain functional terms and are not always safe
and defined.
To solve these problems it is proposed firstly, to restrict
the theory so that only relevant contexts are evaluated. A
context is relevant if it appears in the definition of a security
rule. Secondly, a relevant context is always fully instanti-
ated. Finally it is proposed to pre-compute the evaluation of
the Empower, Use and Consider predicates using a bottom-
up strategy. Then, the evaluation of queries is completed
using the top-down strategy as defined in the SGL algo-
rithm [10]. This hybrid strategy guarantees the decidability
of query evaluation in the OrBAC model and its termination
in polynomial time.
5 Related work
The previous work on delegation has shown that delega-
tion is a complex concept and, to our best knowledge, there
is no complete model for describing all delegation charac-
teristics such as multiple delegation, cascading revocation,
etc.
Proposed models are based on RBAC which is not ex-
pressive enough to deal with the delegation requirements.
To solve this problem it is suggested to extend the RBAC
model to include delegation components, such as new types
of roles, actions, permissions, etc. Unfortunately, this is a
complex task to manage, since it is necessary to add new
components for modeling every delegation characteristic.
For instance, in the RBDM0 model proposed by [2],
authors extend RBAC0 model to define role-based delega-
tion. They define a relation can-delegate ⊆ RxR to control
role delegation and add new components such as: Users-O
and Users-D to differentiate between original and delegated
members, UAO and UAD to specify original member as-
signment and delegate member assignment relations, etc.
They also propose some extensions to RBDM0 to ad-
dress more delegations characteristics. This requires ad-
ditional components. For instance they add new types
of permissions: delegable and non delegable permissions
(permissions-PN and permissions-PD) to model partial del-
egation.
In RBDM1 [3], an extension of RBDM0, is proposed.
This model adds new components such as a partially or-
dered role hierarchy relation RH ⊆ R x R to model dele-
gation using hierarchical roles.
The PBDM model [13] is another delegation model
based on RBAC96. This model uses the can-delegate re-
lation with prerequisite condition to restrict delegates, and
adds new types of roles and permissions to address permis-
sion level delegation requirement. In PBDM0 roles are par-
titioned into regular roles (RR) and delegation roles (DTR).
This partition induces a parallel partition of the two RBAC
components: user-role assignment (UA) and permission-
role assignment (PA). UA is separated into user-regular
role assignment (UAR) and user-delegation role assignment
(UAD). PA is similarly separated into permission-regular
role assignment (PAR) and permission-delegation role as-
signment (PAD).
PBDM1 is an extension to PBDM0 which supports se-
curity administrator involved delegation and revocation.
This model adds new components such as delegatable
roles (DBR), user-delegatable role assignment (UAB) and
permission-delegatable role assignment (PAB).
PBDM2 model is another extension which addresses
a role-to-role delegation. Like other models, PBDM2
adds new components, such as temporal delegatable roles
(TDBR), and redefines existing ones.
The ABDM model [12] is an attribute-based delegation
model, which extend PBDM model to address delegation
constraint. This model redefines the can-delegate relation to
restrict the delegation. The ABDM model is also extended
to ABDMx for more flexibility.
Another delegation model is proposed in [4]. This
model is more complete than previous works. But it also ex-
tends RBAC96 by adding new components to specify more
delegation characteristics like temporary non-monotonic
delegation. It introduces the relations: can-delegate and
can-receive to authorize role delegation, and the relations
can-delegatep and can-receivep to authorize permission del-
egation. Also, it defines actions like xferR0, xferP0, xferP1,
etc, to model roles and permissions transfer. The two rela-
tions tempUA and tempPA are introduced to record tempo-
rary user-role and user-permission delegations.
Like the above discussed works, this model introduces
new relations or actions to model each delegation charac-
teristics. This is a complex task to manage especially when
the delegation model has to be enriched.
Compared to these works, our model is more flexible,
simpler to manage and more complete. Indeed, OrBAC
model offers facilities to deal with delegation requirements
without the need for additional components.
Namely, OrBAC model is based on multi-granular and
contextual licenses. This provides facilities to define many
delegation characteristics like totality, permanence, revoca-
tion, etc.
Moreover, thanks to the use of views we can express a
large number of conditions, which allow us to specify del-
egation constraints; This is modeled by prerequisite con-
ditions associated with the grantee or the grantor. For in-
stance, the professor is permitted to delegate a permission
to manage her courses to her assistant but only if this assis-
tant is a graduate student.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new delegation ap-
proach for role-based access control. We have showed that
it is possible to specify delegation requirements using the
OrBAC formalism. This model is self administrated and of-
fers facilities, such as multi-granular license, contextual li-
cense, use of views, etc., which gives means to specify del-
egation characteristics without adding new components or
modifying the exiting ones. Therefore our approach is more
flexible, simpler and more complete than previous works
based on RBAC model.
The future work will be dedicated to enrich our delega-
tion model and more precisely the revocation mechanism.
We intend to include several of the revocation schemes as
described in [8].
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